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The Significance of WTO’s Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) for Inward FDI in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
ABSTRACT 
The significance of a crucial WTO accession agreement component, that is, Trade Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) agreement in increasing Sub-Saharan African developing country’s appeal for 
investors from abroad is assessed over here. Conventional FDI location determinants like 
macroeconomic stability, market size, infrastructure, trade openness and economic development are also 
considered. Utilising yearly data for 38 Sub-Saharan developing nations over the time period from 1988 
to 2015 in a panel form, the researcher found that removal of market distortions through TRIMs, sound 
macroeconomic management, infrastructure availability, liberalisation of investment and trade regime 
have plausible significant effects on FDI inflows. Contrary to the empirical FDI literature economic 
development is found to be insignificant and market size sensitive to the addition of explanatory 
variables, especially, WTO led TRIMs. Time invariant features such as language, geographical location 
and sea access cannot be evaluated as fixed effect panel estimation technique does not support them.  
Keywords: FDI, WTO, TRIMs, Panel Data and Sub-Saharan Economies 
JEL Classifications: C230, F130, F140, F150, F210, F230 and K330 
INTRODUCTION 
The increasing proportion of multinational’s affiliates in international trade demand for probing the 
factors responsible for this consistently upward trend (Shah, 2011e). Recent empirical research indicates 
that increased liberalisation and elimination of market interventions positively affect FDI inflows 
(Sánchez-Martín, Escribano & De Arce, 2015). The role of World Treaty Organisation (WTO) is given 
inadequate attention in the empirical FDI literature (Zhang & Yang, 2016) and so far researchers have not 
examined its impact on inward FDI in general and that of Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
agreement in particular as advocated in this paper. Understanding the effect of TRIMs on overseas 
investment is vital both for national governments and firms in formulating suitable business, investment 
and trade liberalisation policies (Sane, 2015). A WTO member is required to reduce tariffs as well as 
eliminate any sort of market interventions effecting the operation of local and foreign investors (Beladi & 
Chakrabarti, 2008). This liberalisation of economic policies needs to be extended to every member state 
devoid of any preferences (Dreher, Mikosch & Voigt, 2015). 
Foreign investors are offered incentives in most of the developing countries to attract FDI in the desired 
sectors, activities and locations (Shah, 2012c). These may include tax holidays, tax credits, import 
privileges, accelerated depreciation on plants and machinery, tax concessions and export subsidies (Shah 
& Khan, 2016). They at times limit and regulate the economic and business activities of multinationals in 
the country (Collins, 2016). These controls comprises of export bounds, indigenous employment, local 
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content requirements, restrictions on foreign equity ownership and limitations on transferring profits 
earned by the foreign affiliates to the source country (Brooks, Roland-Holst & Zhai, 2008).  
The aim of trade related invested measures (TRIMs) is to remove, universalise, institutionalise and 
streamline this selective “rewards and punishment” approach that since ages has been a feature of the 
regulations outlining the operations of multinational firms in the host developing countries (Milner, 
2014). If there is a dispute between two member countries, WTO has a state to state dispute settlement 
mechanism. It renders binding decisions on the violator (Shah, 2010). Unlike most of the other decision 
making in the organisation the decision of the dispute settlement panel does not require unanimity among 
members (Shah, 2011a). 
The internationalisation of multinational production activities has shifted the competition for FDI from 
rent seeking to create a business friendly economic atmosphere, consistent with WTO objectives, for the 
commercial activities of the multinational enterprises (Paul, 2015). Thus in order to craft an investment 
promoting, free of market distortion environment in the host economy it seems logical to keep exploring 
the current and potential future factors that has some influence on FDI movements (Sutyrin, Efinova & 
Trofimenko, 2016). The present study by specifically probing the possible effect of TRIMs on overseas 
investment in a set of 38 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies for 28 years from 1988 to 2015 will 
enable us to understand, grasp and further our knowledge of the subject. The relative importance of other 
variables including market size, infrastructure, economic development, macro-economic stability and so 
on is also taken into account. The findings support the fact that TRIMs have a positive significant 
influence on inward investment.  
The existing FDI literature will certainly get enriched from this paper because for the first time the role of 
this WTO component in influencing foreign investment inflows in SSA developing economies is 
examined. The next part discusses the relationship between inward FDI and TRIMs. In section three the 
empirical equation and econometric issues are examined. Part four presents and discusses the results. The 
paper concludes with section five. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review comprises of two parts. The first one synthesise the conventional FDI location pull 
factors. The second thoroughly explore and discusses the trade related investment measures (TRIMs) 
agreement and foreign direct investment relationship. 
Conventional FDI Determinants 
In FDI literature the importance of market size (Shah, 2009; Blonigen & Piger, 2014), economic 
development (Loungani, Mody & Razin, 2002; Maskus, 2015; Shah, 2015), trade openness (Baltagi, 
Demetriades & Law, 2009; Shah, 2011c; Guesmi & Teulon, 2013), macroeconomic stability 
(Balasubramanyam, Sapsford & Griffiths, 2002; Blonigen, 2005; Xing & Wan, 2006; Shah, 2013b) and 
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infrastructure availability and quality (Morisset, 2000; Asiedu, 2004; Shah, 2011f; Robbins & Perkins, 
2012; Shah, 2014b) are empirically established as significant location FDI pull factors. In order to gauge 
the significance of TRIMs for FDI inflows in SSA the researcher have to first control for these 
conventional FDI determinants in the results and analysis section. 
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
TRIMs are a collection of incentives and restrictive measures, designed usually but not exclusively by a 
developing country to influence FDI (Balasubramanyam, 1991). Recognising that these measures are 
inconsistent with article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which necessitate it 
for the members to extend national treatment and similarly, article XI prohibiting them to levy 
quantitative limitations TRIMs were included in WTO to prohibit such practices (Beladi & Chakrabarti, 
2008). Explicitly identified as inconsistent with the two articles are measures related to balancing trade, 
substituting imports, domestic content procurement, export restrictions and foreign exchange 
requirements (Brooks, Fan & Sumulong, 2003).  
The primary instrument under international law for controlling the use of performance requirements 
imposed on foreign investors is the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement (Collins, 
2016). TRIMs agreement includes both new and existing investments and equally covers local and 
foreign firms (Shah, 2011b). It disallow local content requirements such as obligatory purchases or use of 
domestic products; trade balancing issues, that is, attaching the use or procurement of imported items to a 
sum proportional to the value or volume of exports of local products; foreign exchange balancing 
restrictions e-g binding use of foreign currencies to the overseas investor's earnings of foreign exchange 
(Kennedy, 2003). These restrictive measures limit a multinational’s control over its affiliate operations 
and weaken its competitiveness in the host market (Shah & Qayyum, 2015). Ramirez (2006) attributes 
Chile’s and Paul (2015) considers India’s increased FDI inflows to their structural reform program, in 
consonance with their WTO membership, liberalising FDI laws regarding the repatriation of profits, local 
content and export requirements. 
TRIMs agreement depends solely on country to country arbitration system and lacks any investor to state 
set-ups for ensuring the appraisal of investors’ grievances. However, in case of a violation a dispute 
settlement panel is established between the two states which give a binding judgement.  
WTO requires member states to notify all measures that do not conform to the TRIMs agreement within 
three months of accession. The developed members are given two years, developing five and least 
developed seven years to eliminate all distortions (Balasubramanyam, 2016). However, if a developing or 
least developed country is unable to implement TRIMs in the cut-off time, under article 5.3 they can 
apply for an extension and many have done so varying from 7 years by Pakistan to just less than a year by 
Chile (UNCTAD, 2012).  
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The researcher have utilised the number of trade agreements (TAs) signed by a developing country as a 
proxy for TRIMs from the WTO regional trade agreements information system database. Unlike the 
universality of the TRIMs agreement, TAs involves only two or a few partner economies nonetheless 
their focus and commitment to business liberalisation usually go beyond that of WTO especially in the 
context of tariff and service liberalisation (Bora, 2002). Although like TRIMs most trade agreements do 
not have any explicit provisions dealing with the management of FDI in host economies. Still, in principle 
these agreements whether bilateral or regional, are associated with the steady decrease of measures 
restricting the entry and operations of foreign firms and application of positive treatment standards with 
an outlook to discourage discrimination against them (Banga, 2016). Similarly, according to Dee and Gali 
(2007) and Medvedev (2012) the third wave of trade agreements signed from late 1980s, early 1990s 
onwards contain investment provisions which are useful for FDI due to a number of reasons for example 
investment protection, liberalisation, market access, investment promotion and cooperation. They also 
indirectly facilitate overseas investors by streamlining and removing impediments associated with excess 
bureaucracy and improving the overall business and investment environment (Shah & Samdani, 2015). In 
addition, the signatory regimes in order to provide a credible assurance to their partners of an open policy 
on trade and investment, on a minimum not only has to maintain but also strengthen liberal business 
friendly policies domestically to optimise the conceivable benefits of these international agreements for 
example in Mexico following NAFTA (Shah, 2011d). Trade agreements vary from one another but in 
sum they institutionalise and set standards for liberal economic policies (Dreher, Mikosch & Voigt, 
2015). Thus they may be considered as a less comprehensive but more rigorous version of WTO. 
The TRIMs agreement is important for FDI because it is instrumental in abolishing non-tariff barriers 
connected to foreign trade especially those related with overseas investment. It assures investors from 
abroad to freely export, import buy and sell goods for the optimal utilisation of their investment and 
repatriate profits. It also ensures the provision of level playing field for all investors irrespective of their 
nationality because most favoured nation treatment requires the local government to provide similar 
beneficial investment environment to investors from all the members. Similarly, national treatment 
mandates no discrimination between foreign and domestic investors. Therefore, the researcher postulates 
that impartial investment enhancing policies are by design better suited for attracting overseas investors 
and expects a positive relationship between TRIMs implementation and FDI inflows. The extent of the 
net impact however depends on the interaction of several variables including the effect of different 
existing TRIMs which coexist to varying degrees in each developing country (Shah, 2012a).  
Hypothesis of the Study: 
The following hypotheses are set to answer objective of this study: 
Hο: FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan developing economies are not affected by TRIMs 
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H1: FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan developing economies are affected by TRIMs 
Table 1: Expected Effect of the Explanatory Variables on Inward FDI in SSA Countries 
Variables Expected effect 
Market Size Positive 
Economic Development Positive 
Trade Openness Positive 
Exchange Rate Positive 
Infrastructure Positive 
TRIMs Positive 
 
ESTIMATION METHOD AND EMPIRICAL CONCERNS 
The complexities associated with the theories governing overseas trade and investment flows make it 
quite cumbersome to theoretically derive an empirical model (Shah, 2013a). Nonetheless, based on the 
discussion in the previous section the researcher postulate equation one to gauge the effect of TRIMs 
implementation under WTO on inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Sub-Saharan African 
developing economies: 
𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 = 𝒇 (
𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆, 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔,
𝑴𝒂𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆, 𝑻𝑹𝑰𝑴𝑺
) … … … … (𝟏) 
 
In equation one subscript i is used for representing a Sub-Saharan African nation varying from 1 to 38. t 
denotes the time period from 1988 to 2015 varying from 1 to 28, giving me a total of 1064 (28*38) 
observations per variable. FDIit is used for the dependent variable representing the yearly stock of FDI in 
each of the host economy i.  
Putting the proxies for the dependent as well as the independent variables and log linearizing equation one 
gives equation two: 
𝒍𝒏𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 =
𝜶𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑮𝑭𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒𝒍𝒏𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝒍𝒏𝑻𝒆𝒍𝒆 𝑫𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑾𝑻𝑶𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 ∗ 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝑨𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕
… … … … (𝟐) 
Here, ln represents natural log, which also reduces the likely heteroscedasticity (Resmini, 2000). 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is used for market size, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) proxies’ 
development level, aggregate trade measures the degree of openness of the economy, exchange rate is 
utilised for macroeconomic stability and infrastructure availability is captured through telephone density. 
The product of WTO membership and the trade agreements signed and enforce will proxy for TRIMs 
implementation. The data for TA’s and WTO membership was taken from the WTO website, exchange 
rate from Penn World Table 7.0 whereas for all the other variables it was collected from World Bank, 
World Development Indicators. Summary statistics like minimum and maximum values, standard 
 7 
 
deviation, mean as well as number of observations for each variable used in the empirical estimations are 
given in table two.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Proxy Obs. Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
FDIStock Ln FDI 1064 19.6886 19.6098 1.7401 13.3212 25.4275 
Market Size Ln GDP 1064 21.9571 21.9250 1.2531 18.8039 26.3713 
Economic Development Ln GFCF 1064 20.1577 20.1803 1.6680 14.9866 25.5626 
Trade Openness Ln Trade 1064 4.1112 4.0676 0.5411 1.9906 5.5363 
Exchange Rate Ln Xrate 1064 3.9896 4.6296 2.4538 0.0024 12.9921 
Infrastructure Ln Tele 1064 10.7945 10.7538 2.6218 0.0297 17.6621 
TRIMs WLneTa 1064 0.3937 0.6231 0.4733 0.0000 1.6094 
Values are rounded off to four decimal places 
Empirical Estimation Method 
Having observation from 38 countries for 28 years a longitudinal panel seemed to be the appropriate way 
to arrange the data (Shah, 2012b). To choose between the random and fixed effect panel estimation 
technique the Hausman (1978) specification test was carried out which suggests the use of fixed effect 
model with the following results Chi2 (6) = 36.38, Probability > Chi2 = 0.0000. The test fails to reject the 
existence of correlation between αi and Xit that is the individual component and the explanatory variables 
(Nonnenberg & Mendonca, 2004).  
Heteroscedasticity 
Breusch - Pagan / Cook - Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity indicates its presence by out rightly 
rejecting the null hypothesis of homoscedastic standard errors or constant variance with these statistics 
Chi2 (1) = 8.03, Probability > Chi2 = 0.0046 (Carr, Markusen & Maskus, 2001). This issue is tackled by 
applying the robust option with all the regressions and values that are robust to heteroscedasticity are 
reported throughout the study. 
Multicollinearity 
To measure the extent of collinearity between the independent variables the researcher have calculated the 
correlation between all the explanatory variables as well as used variance inflation factor 𝑉𝐼𝐹 =
 (1 1 − 𝑅2⁄ ) as an indicative statistic. It shows the effect of linear associations between the explanatory 
variables upon the variances of the estimators as measured by the coefficient of determination (Shah, 
2012d). In other words the VIF’s of the respective explanatory variables shows the increase in the 
variance of the model due to the fact that they are not orthogonal to one another (Shah & Faiz, 2015). 
The estimations from VIF with a mean value of less than 5 show the absence of problematic 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. The same is evident from the correlation matrix 
given as Table three. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
Serial No Variable Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. FDI Stock 1.00       
2. Market Size 0.61 1.00      
3. Economic Development 0.59 0.79 1.00     
4. Trade Openness 0.25 -0.28 -0.06 1.00    
5. Exchange Rate -0.05 -0.13 -0.13 0.101 1.00   
6. Infrastructure 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.134 0.09 1.00  
7. TRIMs 0.38 0.22 0.21 -0.208 0.28 0.49 1.00 
Values are rounded off to two decimal places 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Using STATA 11 software for annual data from 38 Sub-Saharan African Developing Countries from 
1988 to 2015 the following results were obtained through Fixed Effects Panel Estimation Technique. 
Model one i.e. the third column in table four shows the coefficient for market size variable (GDP) being 
positive and significant as expected. The result is in accordance with the theory as bigger markets offer 
economies of scale, supplementary opportunities of diversification and additional possibilities to make an 
optimal use of the imported technology (Shah, 2016). Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)1 used for 
economic development in model two, though positive, is insignificant contrary to the theoretical 
expectation. Normally the availability and growth of domestic entrepreneurship is directly associated with 
the degree of development and FDI in joint ventures need a certain level of existing local capacity as a 
pre-requisite (Shah, 2014a).  
Table 4: Results: Fixed Effect Panel Regression Method 
Variable Proxy  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market Size Ln GDP 
1.1432*** 
(0.2476) 
0.9601*** 
(0.3311) 
1.0074*** 
(0.2922) 
0.8647*** 
(0.2732) 
0.2861 
(0.3540) 
0.2765 
(0.3539) 
Economic 
Development 
Ln 
GFCF 
 
0.1897 
(0.1618) 
0.0827 
(0.1041) 
0.0679 
(0.0792) 
0.0479 
(0.0713) 
0.0552 
(0.0749) 
Trade Openness Ln Trade   
1.4980*** 
(0.3150) 
1.1029*** 
(0.2973) 
0.8493*** 
(0.3110) 
0.8187** 
(0.3110) 
Exchange Rate Ln Xrate    
0.2938*** 
(0.1076) 
0.1912** 
(0.0859) 
0.1593* 
(0.0843) 
Infrastructure  Ln Tele     
0.2739*** 
(0.0858) 
0.2008** 
(0.0877) 
TRIMs WLneTa      
0.3502** 
(0.1689) 
Number of Observations 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 
Probability > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Coefficient of Determination / R-Squared 38.36% 
Values are rounded off to four decimal places. * signifies significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% 
significance level respectively. The coefficients for all the variables are reported with the respective 
standard errors robust to the detected heteroscedasticity in parenthesis. 
                                                 
1. According to WDI Gross fixed capital formation includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, 
private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. 
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Aggregate trade that is the sum of the imports and exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP 
proxy’s the liberalisation of economy in model three. The array of positively significant coefficients for 
openness throughout table four reveals that multinationals prefer open economies.  
Macroeconomic stability is gauged by direct exchange rate (1US$ = units of host country’s currency) in 
model four. The positive coefficient at 1% significance level shows that FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
primarily export oriented as depreciation of the local currency makes their products relatively cheaper in 
the world market. However, if they would have importing raw materials from abroad the result would 
have been less profound due to the decrease in profits accruing as a result of devaluation of the host 
currency. The significantly positive coefficient for tele-density in model five, proxying infrastructure 
quality and availability supports the notion that multinationals consider it essential for their smooth 
functioning in terms of their affiliates production and trade activities. 
In table four model six, the researcher include the number of trade agreements signed and enforced by a 
host developing country times World Trade Organisation membership (ETA*WTO), used as a proxy for 
TRIMs. It’s significant and positive coefficient shows that an increase in the number of trade agreements 
signed by the host (better TRIMs implementation) causes additional inward FDI. 
Also evident from the model is the decrease in the openness coefficient from 0.8493 to 0.8187 with the 
inclusion of the TRIMs proxy. This signifies that in addition to harmonising the treatment of foreign firms 
among the signatories it also has a role in providing preferential access, which was earlier manifested in 
the liberalisation variable. The preferential treatment under a trade agreement makes it easier for the 
multinational to import raw material or intermediate inputs and export manufactured goods back to the 
developed or other countries. In this aspect it can be even termed as a mini WTO in itself. The researcher 
have also checked for the number of trade agreements signed but not enforced to see whether enforcement 
has any additional effects. The significance level remains the same with a slightly reduced coefficient. 
Therefore, the researcher have presented the results only for enforced trade agreements as assuming that it 
will show the effect of the enforced TRIMs agreement in the host economies.  
CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper is to gauge the possible effect of TRIMs implementation on FDI inflows in 
Sub-Saharan African Developing countries. Using fixed effect panel estimation technique for annual data 
from 1988 to 2015 it was found that presence of larger domestic market attracts multinationals (Shah & 
Afridi, 2015). However, it is sensitive to the addition of other explanatory variables. It may also be due to 
the fact that with the WTO steered decrease in tariffs and other trade restrictions the earlier importance of 
host market size has significantly reduced. Now multinationals are not solely dependent on the local 
market and can sell their products in the neighbouring countries due to trade liberalisation.  
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Infrastructure, trade liberalisation and exchange rate proves to be important locational pull factor for FDI. 
They seem to be significantly influencing overseas investors’ investment decision because the presence of 
such prospects facilitates multinationals in these countries.  
The results confirm that dismantling and reducing TRIMs related market distortions positively affects 
multinationals. This is because of the resultant liberalisation of the trade and investment environment 
adding to a country’s prospects of hosting additional FDI.  
Economic development though an important conventional FDI determinant is insignificant. This may be 
due to the relative backwardness of the economies under consideration. Still, this does not entail that it 
can be left out of a comprehensive mechanism implemented/envisioned for the purpose of increasing the 
attractiveness of a developing country for the overseas investors. Similarly, it need to be kept in mind that 
these results are relevant to the 38 Sub-Saharan African countries only and shall not be generalized 
universally to other countries. Moreover, future researcher can provide better insights with the availability 
of micro industrial or firm specific data. 
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